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ZONING DISCRIMINATION AFFECTING
RETARDED PERSONS
SUSAN MARIE CONNOR *
In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,' the United States
Supreme Court held that a city's refusal to permit group housing for
thirteen mildly to moderately retarded adults in a residential zoning
district was unconstitutional.2 A City of Cleburne zoning ordinance
required the Cleburne Living Center (CLC)3 to apply for a special use
permit as a precondition to establishing any home for the mentally re-
tarded within the city limits.4 Accordingly, CLC submitted its propo-
sal to use a one-story residential structure located in a residential
* Associate Professor at the John Marshall Law School.
1. 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985).
2. Respondent planned to operate the home as a Level I Intermediate Care Facility
for the Mentally Retarded (ICF/MR). An ICF/MR is a medicaid funded program
administered and regulated at the federal level by the Department of Health and
Human Resources. See 42 C.F.R. §§ 442-400-516 (1984). An ICF/MR is administered
and regulated at the state level by the Texas Department of Mental Health and Retarda-
tion. The State of Texas has adopted federal ICF/MR requirements in all respects.
Compare 9 Tex. Reg. 2139-60 (1984) with 42 C.F.R. 442-400-516 (1984).
3. Cleburne Living Center is a Texas corporation organized and licensed for the
purpose of establishing and operating group homes for retarded persons. Cleburne Liv-
ing Center v. City of Cleburne, 726 F.2d 191, 193 (5th Cir. 1983), afid, 105 S. Ct. 3249
(1985).
4. The proposed group home required a special use permit because the city had
classified the facility as a "hospital for the feeble minded"-language used in the zoning
ordinance. 105 S. Ct. at 3252-53 & n.3. Had the structure and proposed group use of
the home been the same in every regard except for the retardation of its intended resi-
dents, the city zoning ordinance would have permitted the group use. For example, the
ordinance permitted the use of structures for tenements, a home for unwed mothers, a
nursing home for the aged, a fraternity or sorority house or a home for delinquent
youth. Id. at 3252 n.3.
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zoning district as a group home for mildly or moderately retarded
adults.' CLC would staff the home with professionals who would not
live at the facility, but would be present in shifts, twenty-ftur hours a
day. Both the structure and the particular use proposed for it fully
complied with the extensive applicable state and federal regulations. 6
Both the City Planning and Zoning Commission and the City Coun-
cil conducted public hearings on the proposed special use permit; the
City Council thereafter voted to deny CLC's application.7 The city
claimed to have based this decision on the following seven factors: the
attitude of a majority of owners of property located within 200 feet of
the subject property; the location of a junior high school across the
street from the subject parcel; concern for the fears of elderly residents
of the neighborhood; the size of the home and the number of people to
be housed; concern over the legal responsibility of CLC for any actions
that the mentally retarded residents might take; the home's location on
a 500 year flood plain; and in general, CLC's presentation before the
City Council.'
Following the denial, CLC filed suit against the city, alleging that
the city's actions violated the due process and equal protection clauses
of the United States Constitution as well as other constitutional and
statutory provisions.9 The city prevailed at the trial level. The lower
5. The home was situated on a 16,700 square foot lot. The house contained 2,700
square feet and had four bedrooms. The home was within walking distance of a public
park, public library and the city's central business district. Abutting the house, which
was situated on a corner lot, was a two-story apartment house; located across the street
from the facility was a junior high school, which was attended by some mentally re-
tarded students.
CLC anticipated that the home would house 13 retarded men and women. The resi-
dents would receive 24 hour supervision and have jobs either in the community or in
workshops supervised by the group home staff. Cleburne, 726 F.2d at 193.
6. See supra note 2.
7. The Commission's vote operated as a recommendation to the City Council,
which subsequently voted three to one to deny the permit. 105 S. Ct. at 3253 & n.4.
8. Cleburne, 726 F.2d at 194. In point of fact, the City Council denied the permit
because of vigorous opposition by property owners adjacent to the proposed facility.
See 105 S. Ct. at 3259 (relying on findings by the district court).
9. Initially CLC alleged that the permit denial violated the federal Revenue Sharing
Act (RSA), 31 U.S.C. §§ 6701-24 (1982). 726 F.2d at 195. They argued that the zoning
function of the City Council was a "program or activity" subject to the nondiscrimina-
tion provisions of that Act pertaining to "otherwise qualified handicapped individuals."
See 726 F.2d at 195; 31 U.S.C. § 6701(a), (b) (1982). Both the district court and the
court of appeals rejected the claim, observing that clear and convincing evidence
showed that the City Council had not used federal funds to finance the zoning activities.
726 F.2d at 195. The court of appeals also rejected CLC's claim that the City Council
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court held that the city's ordinance, both as written and applied, im-
pacted neither a fundamental right nor a suspect classification. 0 Ac-
cordingly, the district court stated it would find the ordinance
constitutional if it could be shown to bear some rational relationship to
a legitimate purpose or interest of the city." The trial court decided
that Cleburne had several legitimate reasons for regulating the group
home, such as concern for the safety and fears of residents in the neigh-
borhood and the legal responsibilities of CLC and its projected resi-
dents2 The court viewed the city's denial as a rational way for the
city to serve its legitimate concerns.
1 3
itself was an activity receiving federal funds and therefore subject to RSA requirements.
The court required a link between the City Council's function of disbursing federal
funds, which arguably subjected those decisions to the RSA, and the City Council's
zoning function. Id. CLC did not pursue this aspect of the case on appeal to the
Supreme Court.
CLC also alleged that the city's denial of its permit application constituted a denial of
procedural and substantive due process, and infringed upon its constitutional rights to
travel and to associate. In addition, CLC claimed that the city's action violated 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1982), which provides a remedy for violations of federal law by those
acting under color of state law. Additional allegations included state equal protection
and due process claims under the Texas Constitution and a statutory claim pursuant to
the Texas Mentally Retarded Persons Act of 1977. Joint Appendix at 97, Cleburne
Living Center v. City of Cleburne, 726 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1983) [hereinafter cited as
Joint Appendix].
Finally, CLC asserted that the Cleburne ordinance, which provided criminal penal-
ties for violations, was unconstitutionally vague. 726 F.2d at 194 n.4. CLC did not
prevail on the right to travel, freedom of association or constitutional vagueness claims
at trial; CLC did not appeal these aspects of the district court's decision.
10. Joint Appendix, supra note 9, at 19.
11. The trial court observed that several lower courts had addressed the question of
what level of judicial scrutiny applied to distinctions based on mental retardation. See,
e.g., Doe v. Colautti, 454 F. Supp. 621, 632 (E.D. Pa. 1978), affid, 592 F.2d 704 (3rd
Cir. 1979) (mentally retarded persons are not a suspect or quasi-suspect class); Sterling
v. Harris, 478 F. Supp. 1046, 1053 (N.D. Ill. 1979), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221 (1981). But see Frederick v. Thomas, 419 F. Supp.
960 (E.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd, 578 F.2d 513 (3rd Cir. 1978) (mentally retarded persons
comprise a quasi-suspect class warranting heightened judicial scrutiny). The lower
court did not explain its terse conclusion that mentally retarded persons are not a sus-
pect or quasi-suspect class of individuals. Joint Appendix at 19.
12. Joint Appendix, supra note 9, at 19.
13. Id. This conclusion is not responsive to the question of whether retarded per-
sons are quasi-suspect. Normally, a court measures the class disadvantaged by govern-
mental action against each of the indicia of suspectness. When the class demonstrates
many suspect characteristics, the court will conclude that the class is quasi-suspect.
The government then must demonstrate that its purpose for discriminating is "impor-
tant," not merely "legitimate;" otherwise the purpose is held constitutionally deficient.
Had the Court been faithful to this standard, detailed in Frontiero v. Richardson, it
19851
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After surveying Supreme Court law that discussed both the appro-
priate level of scrutiny in equal protection cases and the characteristics
of mentally retarded persons, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit concluded that mentally retarded persons constituted
a "quasi-suspect" class and therefore a classification based on retarda-
tion was subject to intermediate scrutiny. 4 Applying intermediate
scrutiny, the Fifth Circuit inquired whether the city's purpose for dis-
criminating was "important" and, assuming that it was, whether that
purpose was "substantially furthered" by denial of the group home
permit. 5 The court concluded that there was an insufficiently close
correspondence "between the city's goals and the ordinance's means
for achieving them because the standardless requirement of a special
use permit for all group homes for the mentally retarded is both vastly
overbroad and vastly under inclusive. ' 6
Following an unsuccessful attempt to obtain a rehearing en banc,17
the Supreme Court granted certiorari.'" The Supreme Court granted
certiorari to address whether mentally retarded persons are a "quasi-
suspect" class for purposes of equal protection, thus requiring that
state action affecting them survive an "intermediate" or "heightened"
would have concluded that distinctions based on retardation must be scrutinized care-
fully. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (sex-based classification). Not
all such distinctions, however, are unconstitutional. See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453
U.S. 57 (1981) (upholding a statute requiring males, but not females to register for the
draft); Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (uphold-
ing a statutory rape law differentiating between genders).
14. 726 F.2d at 198. The Fifth Circuit found that CLC failed to identify any funda-
mental rights that the Cleburne ordinance impaired. Id. at 196. Indeed, the Supreme
Court already has determined that the mentally retarded do not have a fundamental
right to residential placement. Pennhurst State School and Hosp, v. Halderman, 451
U.S. 1 (1981). Had the Court concluded that governmental action impinged on a fun-
damental right, the Court would have invalidated the action. State action prejudicing a
fundamental right is unconstitutional unless it survives "strict scrutiny." This requires
proof that the action was "necessary" to serve a "compelling" state purpose. Scrutiny
that is "strict" in theory is fatal in fact. Gunther, Forward: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L.
REv. 1, 8 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Gunther].
15. 726 F.2d at 200.
16. Id.
17. 735 F.2d 832 (5th Cir. 1984) (per curiam). Six judges dissented from the Fifth
Circuit's denial of the city's petition for rehearing. The dissenters argued that because
mentally retarded persons were significantly different from the rest of society in terms of
their needs and abilities to function, they, unlike women or illegitimate children, were
not an appropriate class to receive heightened judicial scrutiny. Id. at 832-33.
18. 105 S. Ct. 427 (1984).
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judicial scrutiny. 9
As a general rule, the Court will only "minimally" scrutinize state
and local governmental actions that allegedly deny a plaintiff's right to
equal protection. Provided the challenged action is intended to serve
some "legitimate" public purpose and is "rationally related" to serving
the purpose, the Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the
local government.2" The Court's use of minimal scrutiny virtually al-
19. Because the Supreme Court held previously that housing is not a sufficiently
important right to be deemed fundamental, and hence not subject to strict scrutiny
when prejudiced, Village of Belle Terre v. Boras, 416 U.S. 1 (1974); Lindsey v. Normet,
405 U.S. 56 (1972), the plaintiffs in Cleburne based their argument for heightened scru-
tiny on the characteristics of the class disadvantaged by the city's action and sought to
establish that mentally retarded persons are a quasi-suspect class.
In fact, not only had the Court recently decided that housing is not a fundamental
right, but other standards by which the Court ascertains whether a fundamental right
exists were not applicable to the facts of Cleburne. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist.
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (education); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965) (privacy). For example, the right of a retarded person to live with other retarded
persons in a residential group home is neither so deeply rooted in the "traditions and
(collective) conscience of our people ... as to be ranked as fundamental" nor is it
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."
20. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). The rationale for this judicial deference is
the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. As a general proposition, the legis-
lature must be free to make classifications without excessive interference by the judici-
ary. Generally the political process can rectify improvident governmental actions. See
infra note 57. Only when those persons negatively affected by governmental action lack
the opportunity to avail themselves of the political process is judicial interference-in
the form of heightened scrutiny-in order.
Minimal scrutiny is also the rule in "taking" cases, in which a governmental regula-
tory action is alleged to have gone "so far" as to constitute an unconstitutional taking of
property without just compensation in violation of the fifth or fourteenth amendments.
For example, in Pennsylvania Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104
(1978), the Court sustained New York City's landmark-preservation ordinance. The
ordinance prevented Pennsylvania Central Railroad from developing its property rights
to the air space over Grand Central Station. Id. at 138. The Court viewed as "legiti-
mate" the city's objective of historic and architectural preservation. The Court also
found that the city ordinance, which prohibited significant alteration of any landmark,
served those objectives in a rational way. The Court appeared unconcerned that the
effect of the ordinance on Penn Central was an investment-backed expectation loss of
several million dollars.
Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 104 S. Ct. 2321 (1984), is an even more ex-
treme example of the deference the Supreme Court has given to state actions alleged to
have been a taking. In Midkiff the Court had to decide whether the State of Hawaii
constitutionally could shift ownership of property from large, land-holding estates to
individual homeowners. The large estate owners argued that such legislation served no
public purpose. The Court, however, declared that it would not substitute its judgment
as to what constitutes a public purpose for the legislature's judgment unless the legisla-
ture's judgment was without basis. For all practical purposes, then, the Court decided
1985]
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ways results in the challenged action being upheld as constitutional.
For example, the district court in Cleburne found that the city's denial
of a special use permit was rationally related to the legitimate purpose
of preserving neighborhood residential values.21
For decades, however, the Court has been sensitive to the fact that in
certain circumstances a deferential standard of judicial review can be
inappropriate and a far more searching examination of governmental
action is sometimes necessary.22 In particular, the Court routinely has
held that when the class of persons allegedly discriminated against is
"suspect," or the right interfered with is "fundamental," it will apply
strict judicial scrutiny. 2a To ascertain whether a class of persons is
"suspect" the Court inquires as to whether it is a discrete and insular
minority, a victim of prior societal discrimination, a politically power-
less group, and whether its characteristics are immutable or unrelated
to the matters as to which they are discriminated against.24
When discrimination is directed at a suspect class, such as race, it is
judged by the strictest judicial scrutiny and upheld only if it is "neces-
sary" to serve a "compelling" public purpose.25 Classifications sub-
that because the legislature had declared the transfer of land ownership to be in the
public interest, the Court would assume the state action to be in the public interest.
21. 105 S. Ct. at 3253.
22. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 218 (1982); United States v. Carolene Products
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
23. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); United States v. Carolene
Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938). See also supra note 20.
CLC asserted that retardation was immutable insofar as it is "ameliorable but not
curable," that "people who are retarded constitute a group especially vulnerable to mis-
directed and prejudicial actions by public officials;" that official reaction to retardation
historically has been "exclusion and segregation," and that retarded persons have so
routinely been denied education and meaningful political participation that they are
without political power. Brief for Respondents at 30-35, Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. 3249
(1985).
24. In Carolene Products, the Court observed that discrimination against "discrete
and insular minorities may be a special condition" warranting strict scrutiny. 304 U.S.
at 153 n.4. In San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), the Court
explained that a suspect class is one "[s]addled with such disabilities, or subjected to
such a history of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from
the majoritarian political process." Id. at 28.
The court regularly has expressed a disinclination to add to the list of classifications
subject to heightened scrutiny. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 219; Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28.
The Court has not indicated, however, that it wishes to retreat from its long standing
policy of carefully scrutinizing discrimination directed against suspect or "quasi-sus-
pect" persons.
25. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
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jected to strict scrutiny virtually always are invalidated because even if
such classifications serve compelling governmental interests, they are
not, in all likelihood, necessary to serve those purposes.26
The Court has applied an "intermediate" level of scrutiny, some-
thing between "minimal" and "'strict," to certain other classifications.
The Court employs this level of judicial scrutiny when it decides that
the class discriminated against possesses some, though not all, of the
indicia of suspectness, for example, gender.27 In order to survive inter-
mediate judicial scrutiny, a governmental action must be "substantially
related" to an "important" governmental purpose.28
The record in Cleburne was replete with documentation that men-
tally retarded persons long have been victims of false stereotyping and
stigmatization.29 Society has isolated the retarded, housing them in
26. One should note, however, that strict scrutiny does not insure invalidation of a
challenged act. See Tancil v. Woolls, 379 U.S. 19 (1964), afig, Hamm v. Virginia State
Bd. of Elections, 230 F. Supp. 156 (1964); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1944).
27. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
To date the Court has limited intermediate scrutiny to distinctions based on gender,
some distinctions based on illegitimacy and distinctions affecting access to public educa-
tion based upon parental status of illegal residence in the United States. Plyler v. Doe,
457 U.S. 202 (1982).
28. Craig, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
29. The trial court specifically found that "persons who are mentally retarded have
been subjected to exclusion from the political process and have been isolated in remote,
stigmatizing, living arrangements." Joint Appendix, supra note 9, at 9. Historically
rooted stereotypes about mentally retarded persons run so deep that as the Fifth Circuit
observed, "[o]nce-technical terms for various degrees of retardation--e.g., 'idiots,'
'imbeciles,' 'morons'-have become popular terms of derision." 726 F.2d at 197. See
infra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
The Third Circuit likewise has noted that retarded persons "may well be a paradig-
matic example of a discrete and insular minority for whom the judiciary should exercise
special solicitude .... The retarded cannot vote in most states, and, with few commu-
nity ties, sponsors or friends have minimal impact on the political process." Romeo v.
Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147, 163 n. 35 (3rd Cir. 1980), vacated on other grounds, 457 U.S.
307 (1982). See generally J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, 135-79 (1980). See also
Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. Olson, 561 F. Supp. 473 (D.N.D. 1982), aft'd, 713 F.2d
1384 (8th Cir. 1983) (intermediate scrutiny appropriate in light of lingering discrimina-
tion); Fialkowski v. Shapp, 405 F. Supp. 946, 958 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (finding retarded
persons a suspect class).
Even the Supreme Court has categorized retarded persons through stigmatizing ste-
reotypes. Justice Holmes, in upholding a compulsory sterilization law, stated that "[we]
have seen more than once that the public welfare may call upon the best citizens for
their lives. It would be strange if it could not call upon those who sap the strength of
the State for these lesser sacrifices... three generations of imbeciles are enough." Buck
v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927). See also S. GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN 335-
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remote living arrangements. 30 The retarded frequently have been un-
able to vote and have been deprived the benefits of public school sys-
tems.31  Additionally, retardation is a condition that is largely
immutable and uncontrollable. 32  These factors, CLC argued, com-
pelled the Court to require the city to discriminate only for very impor-
tant, not merely legitimate, reasons. These disadvantages also required
the city to use means carefully tailored to its purpose so as to have a
less negative impact than absolutely denying retarded persons access to
the only available community living alternative.33
The Supreme Court disagreed.3 4 The Court began by observing that
mentally retarded persons have a reduced ability to function in soci-
ety.35 The Court cited Frontiero v. Richardson, the case holding that
gender-based classifications are quasi-suspect, thus requiring height-
ened judicial scrutiny.3 6 In Frontiero the Court pointed out that ".
what differentiates sex from such nonsuspect statuses as intelligence or
physical disability, and aligns it with recognized suspect criteria, is that
the sex characteristic bears no relation to ability to perform or contrib-
ute to society.",37 The Cleburne Court cited Frontiero to establish that
distinctions based on a class without full capacity or ability to perform
are not inherently suspect and hence do not warrant heightened judi-
36 (1981); Note, Equitable Jurisdiction to Order Sterilizations, 57 WASH. L. REV. 373,
375 n. 11 (1982).
30. Cleburne, 726 F.2d at 197.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. The trial court determined that "[g]roup homes currently are the principal com-
munity living alternatives for persons who are mentally retarded." Group homes are
especially important because many states now deinstitutionalize the mentally retarded,
rather than the previous policy of placing them in large, generally remote institutions.
See generally Okolo and Guskin, Community ,4ttitudes Toward Community Placement
of Mentally Retarded Persons, 23 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH IN MENTAL
RETARDATION, 25 (1984); Note, A Review of the Conflict Between Community-Based
Group Homes for the Mentally Retarded and Restrictive Zoning. 82 W. VA. L. REV.
677 (1981).
34. 105 S. Ct. at 3255-56, 3258.
35. Id. at 3256. The city argued it had a right to discriminate against mentally
retarded persons because the characteristics of the mentally retarded reduce their ability
to care for themselves. Therefore, city regulations that discriminate on the basis of
these disabilities are not suspect and need only be minimally scrutinized.
36. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (distinctions based on gender war-
rant heightened judicial scrutiny).
37. Id. at 686, quoted in, City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct.
3249, 3255 (1985).
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cial scrutiny. The more precise point, though, is that some discrimina-
tion against a given class may be related to the abilities of members of
that class, whereas other forms of discrimination against the same class
may be wholly unrelated to the abilities of persons in that class. The
former kinds of discrimination are not suspect, the latter are.3 8 The
Cleburne Court, however, did not make any such fine distinction. It
merely concluded that because mentally retarded persons are "differ-
ent," the state's interest in "dealing with them and providing for them
is plainly a legitimate one.",
39
The Cleburne Court then rejected the proposition that retarded per-
sons are sufficiently victimized by discrimination to warrant heightened
scrutiny. The Court asserted that ". . . the distinctive legislative re-
sponse, both national and state, to the plight of those who are retarded
demonstrates ... that the lawmakers have been addressing their diffi-
culties in a manner that belies a continuing antipathy or prejudice and
a corresponding need for more intrusive oversight by the judiciary. '4
38. The clear implication of the Frontiero dicta, that classifications related to ability
are not suspect, is that classifications related to ability are suspect. Therefore, some
employment discrimination against retarded persons is not suspect and need not be
scrutinized carefully, while other discrimination against the retarded persons may re-
quire heightened judicial scrutiny. For example, when there is a relationship between
membership in the class and an individual's needs and abilities, as would exist if the city
prohibited severely retarded persons from living together without professional assist-
ance, the distinctions based on mental retardation would not be inherently suspect.
Further, neither Supreme Court precedent nor logic compels the conclusion that dis-
crimination based upon a particular class should always be scrutinized by the same
standard. For example, the Court generally scrutinizes strictly distinctions based upon
a person's alienage, and yet at times the court uses minimal scrutiny of distinctions
based on alienage for public policy reasons. Compare Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
365 (1971) (states cannot deny welfare benefits to aliens) with Ambach v. Nowick, 441
U.S. 68 (1979) (statute requiring school teacher be U.S. citizen valid). In Cabell v.
Chavez-Salido the Court opined that "... although citizenship is not a relevant ground
for the distribution of economic benefits, it is a relevant ground for determining mem-
bership in the political community." 454 U.S. 432, 443 (1982). Therefore, the Court
would only minimally scrutinize discrimination that prevented aliens from working as
"peace officers," but would strictly scrutinize barriers to an alien's working as a janitor.
39. Id. at 3258. CLC never argued that legislation directed at retarded persons
would fail to serve a legitimate public interest. Rather, the issue was whether a merely
legitimate interest, as opposed to an important interest, was constitutionally sufficient to
permit discrimination against retarded persons. See supra note 13.
40. 105 S. Ct. at 3256. The city also argued that mentally retarded persons were not
a politically powerless group because a number of federal and state reforms concerning
the rights of mentally retarded persons have recently been enacted. Petitioner's brief at
21-22, Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985). See, e.g., Education of the Handicapped Act,
20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1461 (1982); Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982);
1985]
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The flaw in the Court's argument is that it confuses the group's "his-
tory of purposeful unequal treatment"'" with the group's current
status.42
Similarly, the Court decided that because legislation benefitting re-
tarded persons exists, "which could hardly have occurred and survived
without public support," such legislation refuted the argument that
mentally retarded persons are politically powerless. 43 The Court fails
to recognize that the mere fact that a group has been made the benefici-
ary of some affirmative action does not negate both current victimiza-
tion in other areas and political powerlessness in any real sense.
44
Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6000-6081
(1982); Mentally Retarded Persons Act of 1977, TEX. STAT. ANN. art 5547-300
(Vernon Supp. 1985).
41. San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
42. In Frontiero v. Richardson, the Court decided that classifications based upon
gender were suspect, in part because of this country's history of discrimination against
females. 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973). The Frontiero Court so held despite congressional
enactment of the Equal Pay Act and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which both prohib-
ited gender discrimination. Id. at 686. Twelve years later, Justice Marshall, in his
separate Cleburne opinion, noted that the Court has "never suggested that race based
classifications became any less suspect once extensive legislation had been enacted on
the subject." 105 S. Ct. at 3269.
43. See supra note 42.
The Supreme Court also expressed a concern that if it decided heightened scrutiny
was appropriate, "merely requiring the legislature to justify its efforts ... may lead it to
refrain from acting at all," and hence much legislation regarded as advantageous would
not be passed. 105 S. Ct. at 3257. This concern is entirely misplaced for two reasons.
First, heightened scrutiny, especially if it is only "intermediate" and not "strict," can be
satisfied if the government shows it had an important reason for acting, and that the
action it took was significantly related to serving this purpose. The government's bur-
den, as Justice Marshall has said, is not heavy if the government did, in fact, have good
reason to act and acted carefully. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 591 (1972).
Second, the Court's concern that use of heightened scrutiny will chill passage of advan-
tageous legislation obscures the fact that the Court routinely scrutinizes action
favorable to a disadvantaged class less strictly than action unfavorable to the same class.
For example, the Court strictly scrutinizes race discrimination that disadvantages mi-
norities, but scrutinizes race discrimination favoring minorities less strictly. Compare
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) and Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399 (1964) with
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); compare Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313
(1977) and Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974) with Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199
(1977) and Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975). Accordingly, when munici-
palities act to benefit retarded persons, they would not be completely burdened by the
requirement of showing both an "important purpose" and means "substantially related"
to that purpose.
44. In Cleburne, for example, although retarded persons may have been the benefi-
ciaries of federal assistance with respect to educational opportunities, they had no polit-
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The Court also observed that because the class of retarded persons is
"large and amorphous," it would be "difficult to find a principled way
to distinguish" them from persons not at all suspect.45 Therefore, the
Court found retarded persons evidence too few indicia of suspectness
to be regarded as even quasi-suspect.46 The Court opined, however,
that this conclusion "does not leave them entirely unprotected from
invidious discrimination" because the challenged action must still be
rationally related to a legitimate interest.47 The Court concluded that
Cleburne's requirement of a special use permit for CLC's proposed use
at the site for which CLC applied was unconstitutional.48 The Court
found that none of the seven reasons advanced by the city for denying
the permit were legitimate. The prejudice of neighbors "unsubstanti-
ated by factors which are properly cognizable in a zoning proceeding"
is not a permissible reason for prohibiting a group home.49 The prox-
imity of the proposed home to a junior high school was not a legitimate
reason because the school allowed retarded persons to attend and the
claim appeared to be nothing more than "vague, undifferentiated fear
.... "0 The city's concern that the subject parcel was located on a 500
year flood plain was not legitimate because all other group uses of the
property would have involved an identical flood concern, yet the city
required no other group to secure a special use permit.51 Fourth, the
city had no legitimate interest in regulating the size of the proposed
home and the number of residents because, as both lower courts found,
"[i]f the potential residents ... were not mentally retarded, but the
home was the same in all other respects, its use would be permitted" as
ical power to obtain the zoning approval needed for their housing; political pressure by
the townspeople caused the City Council to discriminate against CLC.
45. 105 S. Ct. at 3257-58. The class of women or aliens is also "large and amor-
phous," but this has not precluded the Court's use of heightened scrutiny for distinc-
tions based upon gender or alienage.
46. Id. at 3258.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 3259.
49. Id. The Court failed to explain this phrase. What factors the Court believes are
"properly cognizable in a zoning proceeding," however, is difficult to discern because
the very factors considered deficient by the Court in Cleburne, such as property values
and the citizenry's sense of security, had been held previously by the Court to be legiti-
mate public concerns. See Village of Belle Terre v. Boras, 416 U.S. 1 (1974); Berman v.
Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
50. 105 S. Ct. at 3259.
51. Id.
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of right.52 Likewise, the Court found no evidence warranting the con-
clusion that the intended residents would contribute to congestion, fire
hazard or neighborhood disfunction any more than would individuals
who were permitted by the city to reside on the subject parcel as of
right.5
3
The Cleburne case is troublesome both from the perspective of those
who advocate rights of the mentally retarded and because of its aber-
rant constitutional analysis.5 4 Although CLC eventually prevailed in
Cleburne, the Court's pronouncement that classifications based on re-
tardation are not suspect or quasi-suspect does little to deter cities and
villages from enacting similar discriminatory regulation."
More importantly, Cleburne and two other cases of the same term,
indicate the Court's willingness to apply a rational relation test "with
bite.' 5 6 The Court's use of minimal scrutiny traditionally always re-
52. 726 F.2d at 200, quoted in, 105 S. Ct. at 3259-60. The Court observed that
although retarded persons have disabilities that other persons who could reside in the
home without a special use permit did not share, there was no evidence in the record
indicating how "the characteristics of the intended occupants ... rationally justify de-
nying to those occupants what would be permitted to groups occupying the same site
for different purposes." 105 S. Ct. at 3260.
53. 105 S. Ct. at 3260.
54. Justice Marshall asserted that the case is procedurally, as well as substantively,
"curious" because the Court did not strike down the ordinance, although the Court
found it was enacted because of "irrational prejudice." 105 S. Ct. at 3272. Rather, the
Court merely held the ordinance unconstitutional as applied to CLC. Id. This, of
course, forces other mentally retarded persons to relitigate the constitutionality of the
ordinance. See id.
55. Congress, of course, could prohibit housing discrimination against mentally re-
tarded persons notwithstanding the Court's refusal to judge any such discrimination by
a standard of heightened scrutiny. For example, Congress could amend the Fair Hous-
ing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-31 (1982).
56. See Gunther, supra note 14, at 18-19.
In Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 105 S. Ct. 1676 (1985), the Court invalidated
an Alabama domestic preference statute that taxed out-of-state insurance companies
more heavily than in-state companies. The lower state court found that the statute
served at least two legitimate state interests: encouraging capital investment in the state
and encouraging the development of a local industry that would be more responsive to
the needs of state residents. Id. at 1679. The Court held that the statute did not survive
minimal scrutiny. Id. at 1684. Justice Powell, writing for the majority, argued that the
statute was unconstitutional because the state implemented its purposes in a "plainly
discriminatory manner." Id. This language appears to criticize the state's means rather
than its purposes. Indeed, Justices O'Connor, Brennan, Marshall and Rehnquist, who
seldom concur with one another, faulted the majority for "collapsing the two prongs of
the rational basis test into one. . . ." Id. at 1692.
In Williams v. Vermont, 105 S. Ct. 2465 (1985), the Court invalidated a Vermont
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sulted in the challenged action being upheld as constitutional.57
Ironically, after its protestation that heightened scrutiny is unneces-
sary when judging distinctions based upon mental retardation, the
Court itself, in essence, did subject the city's action to more than the
conventional minimal scrutiny test. 8 Some, if not all, of the interests
asserted by the City of Cleburne were legitimate objects of the police
power. It is certainly within a municipality's power to protect the well
being of both its residents and their property values. If prohibiting a
group home would, or could, serve any of those interests in any way,
mere minimal scrutiny would require sustaining the city's denial. Nev-
ertheless, the Court concluded that the record in the case did not estab-
lish that Cleburne's ordinance and denial of a permit to CLC served
any legitimate interest. As Justice Marshall points out in his partial
dissent, however, when invoking minimal scrutiny the Court does "not
sift through the record to determine whether policy decisions are
squarely supported by a firm factual foundation."59 Rather, the Court
statute that collected a use tax on vehicles it registered to persons who had purchased
their automobiles out of state. Vermont reduced a person's use tax by the amount of
any tax paid to another state if the registrant was a Vermont resident at the time. Non-
residents paid the use tax with no offset. Vermont argued that the taxation scheme
served the purposes of encouraging purchases of automobiles within the state, requiring
users of state roads to pay for them and enabling Vermont citizens to shop in other
states without penalty. Id. at 2473-74. Although the Court stated that the legislation
served no legitimate interests, Id. at 2472, the Court actually found fault with the stat-
ute not because Vermont's purposes were illegitimate, but because the means selected
were insufficiently related to serving those purposes. Id. at 2474. The Court concluded
that "residence at the time of purchase is a wholly arbitrary basis on which to distin-
guish among present Vermont registrants .... " Id.
Although in Ward and Williams the Court was less deferential to state economic
statutes, it is premature to predict that the court may be embarked upon a return to
"Lochnerizing," that is, scrutinizing legislative actions carefully, and frequently invali-
dating them. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
57. See United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980). In Fritz
the Court upheld a retirement act classification that provided for double, or windfall,
benefits to some classes of employees but not others. The Court stated that "where, as
here, there are plausible reasons for governmental action, our inquiry is at an end. It is,
of course, constitutionally irrelevant whether this reasoning in fact underlay the legisla-
tive decision." 449 U.S. at 179. In Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955), the
Court established a deferential standard to scrutinize the means selected by government
to serve its "plausible" interest. The Court stated: "It is enough that there is an evil at
hand and that it might be thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational
way to correct it." 348 U.S. at 488.
58. 105 S. Ct. at 3258. In his partial dissent Justice Marshall stated that the major-
ity used a "'second order' rational basis review." Id. at 3264.
59. Id.
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simply should look at whether the city might have had a legitimate
interest in undertaking its action. Then the Court finds that the means
selected by the city are sufficiently related to that purpose if the Court
merely can conceive of a connection between the purpose and means. 60
The Cleburne Court's opinion leaves readers uninformed as to why it
subjected the Cleburne City Council's action to the more searching in-
quiry that resulted in its being held unconstitutional. Perhaps, as Jus-
tice Marshall has been arguing for years, the decision is sensible when
one considers and balances the following three factors: the character of
the classification in question, the relative importance to the individual
of the right affected and the importance of the governmental interest
supporting the classification.61 Mentally retarded persons evidence
several indicia of a suspect class; the right to housing is very important;
and the city's denying CLC a permit only served a limited public pur-
pose. The real problem with the Cleburne decision, though, lies in the
fact that the court fails to provide any clear direction as to when, if
ever, zoning discrimination against retarded persons is constitutional.
60. See, e.g., Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979); New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S.
297 (1976); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
61. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98 (1973) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 508 (1970) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
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